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PERSONAL RESPONSE AND
THE NATURAL LAW
M. G. Plattel

CONTEMPORARY

society has acquired a dynamic character through the

development of science and technique. In our technical age it sometimes
looks as if continuous change is the only thing which does not change.
Man realizes that his own humanity is subject to evolution. Hence a
pinching question arises: Does man's ethics still possess an absolute validity
and an immutable foundation? Thinkers representing different trends in
contemporary philosophy are critical of the old moral conceptions. Personalist
philosophers stress the uniqueness of every person and maintain that traditional ethics is too uniform and too little applicable to the particular
situation. Existentialism enters a protest against the unauthenticity of the
lives of the impersonal masses. It judges the traditional morals as heteronomous and as therefore fostering unauthenticity. It emphasizes that the
ultimate norms for moral behavior stem from personal freedom and personal

conscience.
These different trends in modern philosophy pose the problem of whether
the traditional natural law ethics is still of value for our time. In what
follows I wish to deal with this problem and to confront the theory of natural

law with some present tendencies in ethical thinking.
I.

THE NATURAL

LAW AS "IDEA" AND AS "DOCTRINE"

GENERAL the concept of natural law elicits the thought of a totality
of norms that govern the actions of man and society. The concept of natural
law reflects the attempt to protect law and morals from human arbitrarinss
and to give them absolute validity. In this attempt nature is conceived of
as an absolute reality which determines man's behavior.
In traditional treatments the natural law is technically described as the
theoretical and generally valid principles deriving from the nature of man
or society. These universal principles are considered to possess absolute, immutable, and supratemporal value. At the same time general principles, by

IN

virtue of their very abstractness, are considered to require embodiment in
the concrete. This means that the concrete circumstances of place and time
have to be considered when putting principles into practice. Concrete acts
must be evaluated in the enlightening intelligibility of these basic principles.
16
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The concrete and hence variable application should remain within the orbit
of the immutable principles and may not impair them.
This traditional approach distinguishes sharply between the immutable,
supratemporal natural principles and their application to the historical situation. Modem philosophy rightfully objects to such a one-sided, conceptual
mode of thought. It is exactly man's involvement in history which forms a
central theme in modem philosophic thinking. Traditional natural law theory
likewise assumes a historical element in man. This element, however, is understood more as a condition, an external, though important, phenomenon
which determines the person from outside. But involvement in history goes
deeper and affects the entire person in his very being. The natural law in
the traditional sense is considered far too much as an ahistorical category.
Men have all too often propounded a univocal concept of natural law
which was closely associated with an antiquated cultural pattern. It has
been assumed that man existed in a "given" world order of immutable and
supratemporal entities, from the appearance of which he would be able to
deduce, from without, the human norm for his actions. In addition, human
nature was largely understood as an "object," and the norms which resulted
from this "object" were placed in an objectivistic, independent order, a
monde-en-soi. The natural law was thus too easily used as an "object at
hand."
A conservative influence emanated from this immutable and eternal
order to which man had to conform. This past mode of thought makes an
unnatural and unreal impression, since man's involvement in history is increasingly emphasized by the accelerating growth of his culture. It cannot
be stressed sufficiently that human nature is a free nature. Man, as a person,
possesses an irreplaceable originality. This originality does not imply that
as a person he confers upon the world and upon himself an arbitrary meaning. Human freedom - a finite and participating freedom - involves being
bound by values. It is precisely in intersubjective human relationships that
man paradoxically finds his highest freedom in being totally bound and yet
totally free.
This emphasis on personal intrinsic value does not involve a relativist
subjectivism, because, no matter how contradictory this may sound, human
beings are in fact equal in their very inequality. We are here concerned with
the concrete universality of absolute values such as love, faithfulness, freedorn, which can only be expressed in analogous, universal ideas. They cannot be applied as principles of the natural law in the sense of univocal, uniform norms. These values are immanent in men, and by virtue of this immanence transcend man. Insofar as man has a corporal nature he can be
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classified as a "species," and in this regard we can speak of a certain uniform, universal "human condition." By this we mean determining factors
which are biological, psychological, and sociological. It is particularly these
corporal levels of personal being which can be formulated in terms of a
more explicit body of uniform norms and legal regulations. But since we
are dealing with a spiritualized corporal nature, we must likewise stress the
existentiality of this uniform structure. Indeed the person must function within
biological and psychological limitations which color his being, but he is called
to make these given corporal qualities part of his personal, free existence.
The greater the spiritual content of human values, the less these values
can be expressed in a univocal conceptual manner, and the more they must
be expressed in an analogous ideal manner. There exists a certain inverse
proportionality between nature as a concrete existential reality and nature
as approached in. a univocal conceptual manner. The more something belongs to the essence of personal being, i.e., to the essence of spiritual being,
the less it can be considered in the light of a univocal conceptual formulation of the natural law. Rather, it is known intuitively and spontaneously,
although its expression in a concept - albeit in an analogous ideal-concept
- cannot be dispensed with.' The more, however, something is capable of
being univocally defined, the less one is dealing with those values which
touch upon the essence of personal being. Then we are speaking of the biological rather than the spiritual nature of man. Thus there exists a certain
inverse proportionality between nature as intuitively known and nature as
univocally conceived.
The human person as an incarnate spirit is historical, that is, supratemporal in a temporal order, unchangeable in changeability. Both elements completely interpenetrate each other and cannot be separated. From this fact
it follows that the distinction between natural law as an immutable law, and
positive law as a changeable law, must be used with caution. 2 We are dealing here with a tentative, conceptual, and retrospective systematization of
1. Univocal-universal concepts are ordered logically according to genus and species. They
should be distinguished from analogous-universal ideas or concepts, which are called transcendentals. Between the two extremes of univocal concepts and analogous-universal ideas
all sorts of intermediary forms exist. The univocal meaning of a concept is most clearly
prevalent in the material realm where we talk of individuals of the species. Thus, insofar as
we can speak of man as a corporal being, the univocal concept applies to a certain extent.
But concepts which are related to man as a spiritual being are analogous ideal-concepts. Man
as a spiritual person is not an individual of the species, but in this view he is a species all by
itself. With regard to man as a spiritual person, a univocal repetition of the same abstract
species is out of the question; we are rather concerned with an intrinsic repetition of the
analogous idea of species. Cf. J. PETERS, METAPHYSICS 279-280 (1957); M. G. PLATTEL,
1 SOCIALE WIJSBEROEERTE: DR MENS EN HET MEDEMENSELIJKE 21-24 (2nd ed., 1960).
2.
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(1955).
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the one historical reality; outside of this systematization the above distinction makes no sense whatsoever. The natural law as an objective totality,
contained in univocal concepts and composed of rules, possesses an element
of changeability; in this sense it can already be called positive law. However,
insofar as the norms of the natural law tend to refer to absolute value, they
also share in this value and hence are unchangeable. Positive law, on the
other hand, is not purely changeable; if it were, it would be subhuman. It is
only brute material reality that changes. Positive law shares, no matter how
remotely, in absolute justice, and for this reason must be "respected." Thus
in its turn positive law could also be called natural law, but in a restricted
sense.
The idea of a natural law as an ahistorical reality, which in its supratemporality and immutability could be completely known by man in explicit concepts, is to be rejected. Man does not possess an "all-surveying"
vision, a regard survolant; as a limited "situated" person, he can only become conscious of the absolute ideal. If natural law is conceived, according
to an idealistic pattern, as a known ahistorical reality, it degenerates into
an object at man's command. However, man does not have this reality at
his disposal, as natural law dogmatists wrongly believe.
The advocates of such a rationalistic conception oftentimes reproach the
proponents of a "historical" natural law with ethical relativism. This objection
is unfounded and should rather be addressed to these dogmatists themselves.
Historicity is sometimes too easily identified with pure relativism and arbitrariness. True historicity originates exactly in virtue of a transhistorical
reality. The historical aspect includes an aspect of the absolute, which indeed cannot be isolated from the temporal, but from which nevertheless our
total historical existence derives its ascending dynamics and meaning. It is
precisely because the moral ideal possesses such a transcendent value that
man can participate in it evermore fully only by his growth and searching
though the centuries, so that natural law is never completed, but rather
always discovered more deeply. Precisely through man's perceiving of what
is relative in the natural law, he transcends relativism and touches upon
moral reality in the absolute. It is the rationalist who makes his relative conception of the natural law into the "immutable natural law," and thus seals
it off from any further growth. This conceptualism, which in fact identifies
what is relative with the absolute, is itself the grossest form of relativism.
The more the historical perspective and evolutionary nature of the natural
law comes to the fore, the more profound the apprehension of transcendent
truth will become. This development does not imply that our knowledge of
the natural law changes in the univocal sense of forever becoming different.
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Our historical consciousness implies precisely an all-pervading orientation beyond history. Knowledge of the natural law by ideal-concepts does not so
much change as grow. Only insofar as we intentionally touch upon the absolute by way of conceptual structures - with their material and spatial
symbols - can we speak to a certain degree of change; the concept now
appears in all its poverty. Insofar, however, as the concept is the expression
of that which is known intuitively - in its richness as ideal-concept - we
touch upon moral reality in its absoluteness, but in a way which demands
a continued growth toward truth.
Existential ethics emphasizes the concrete universality of the moral ideal
which every person ought to fashion individually and at the same time in
an analogous, universal manner. This ethics expresses itself particularly in
ideal-concepts. Thus expressed, existential ethics lacks the logical, univocal
lucidity of a natural law which bases itself on the nature of man and society
considered in their character of "object," but this logical pseudo-lucidity is
transcended in personalist ethics by the suprarational light of the authentic
ethical consciousness. It is true that man, because of the determined aspect
3f his being, continues to need practical norms which are imposed on him
from outside. Human intuition still needs to be clarified in concepts. However, a truly ethical man will not so much perceive these norms in their
objective aspects as view them as existent symbolic actualizations of the concrete-universal ideal of man, which is realized in the personal union of love.
The natural law cannot be absolutely proved according to the canons of
positive knowledge, since we are not dealing with a material reality. There
exists, to a certain degree, the possibility of rendering a rational account according to the degrees of perfection which the natural law expresses. The
more, however, we are concerned with spiritual values, the less scientific
verification applies. Besides, on this higher level, the need for this verification constantly decreases. Spiritual realities are known through a believing
and loving attitude; in other words, through the light of human subjectivity
itself. Cognizance of the natural law is impossible without an act of faith.$
This form of belief belongs to a different order of things than that of knowing
"objective" reality. In the case of rational scientific knowledge, faith and
knowledge are indeed opposite entities. If man knows anything on the level of
science, he no longer believes; and if he believes on this level, then he has not
yet attained to knowledge. On this level, faith is indeed a lesser form of knowledge. However, in knowing a spiritual reality, faith and knowledge must not be
understood according to the univocal manner of scientific knowledge. Here,
3.

Cf.

PLATTEL,

ms 71-81 (1951).

Op. Cit. supra note 1, at 33-37; also A.
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faith and knowledge are not inversely proportionate. Whereas faith on the
rational scientific level results from my knowing so very little, faith in the
spiritual reality results from my knowing so very much. In this context, faith
does not occupy the place of knowledge, and knowledge does not occupy the
place of faith. On this level, my believing is a knowing believing; my knowing,
a believing knowing. One errs if one poses the problem of "faith or knowl4
edge" in regard to the knowing of spiritual reality.
The person discovers the natural law as a value from the vantage point
of his freedom. In this sense, the law's values are subjective and immanent.
However, the more ethically a person lives in meaningful freedom, the more
he is aware that the absolute is more immanent in him than he is in himself.
He experiences his freedom as a loving answer to the person of another and
to the Absolute Other One. Hence, a possible reproach that a personalist
ethics is subjective in the sense of being arbitrary appears unjustified. Many
misunderstandings arise because "subjective" and "objective" are oftentimes
understood ambiguously. If one puts the question whether ethical values are
objective or subjective, one must carefully qualify one's answer, because the
terms used should not be understood in their univocal physical sense, but
in their spiritual analogous interpretation. But this analogous interpretation
can, in turn, only come into being by making use of a certain univalence
inherent in the external world; and this univalence, in turn, must be corrected.
If the term "objective" is understood univocally - in the same manner
as the material world imposes itself upon man in a determining way as an
externally given factor - then this term cannot be used in expressing moral
values, since only the person himself as a free subject must fashion such
values. In this sense ethics is indeed subjective. Conversely, if one understands the term "subjective" as univocally referring to a subject who can
deal with a material object arbitrarily and freely, then it must be emphasized
that the values are objective. The person does not create the values; rather,
the values determine him. No matter how paradoxical it may sound, a wellbalanced personalist ethics is subjective because it is objective, and it bears
the mark of objectivity by virtue of its true "subjectivity." This paradox
exists because the natural law is an analogous ideal-concept which - in the
course of time and varying with the person - is realized again and again
in a different, yet similar, manner. To state it once more: the natural law
as an analogous ideal-concept does not change in a univocal sense, and hence
the idea of an ethical relativism is definitely out of the question.
4.

Cf. M. G. PLATTEL, 1 SoCiALE WxJSBEOEERTE: DE MENS EN HET MEDEMENSELIJKE

33-36 (2nd ed., 1960).

NATURAL LAW FORUM

II. THE MAXIMS OF THE NATURAL LAW IN THEIR RICHNESS AND POVERTY
to formulate ethical reality in terms of natural law precepts
remains meaningful and necessary on condition that rational understanding
stays in touch with spontaneous consciousness. The implicit, intuitive moral
consciousness must be rendered explicit in principles in order to take on
THE

ATTEMPT

reality. In this respect we may speak of the richness of the maxims. On the
other hand, the conceptual appropriation of the principles will always remain imperfect; and seen in this light, the principles manifest a faulty character and signify impoverishment. This impoverishment can be counteracted
by constantly keeping the precepts of natural law in touch with spontaneous
feelings and reactions. These precepts must not be too much employed as
a priori insights used to explain historical realities from without. Moreover,
if the principles are too much separated from their historical context and
from practice, they wither to the level of abstract and empty categories. Thus
the norms of love and respect if divorced from every ethical experience constitute an empty formula.
Should the principles in their conceptual expression be severed anyhow
from the experience and be taken as lucid perceptions, the result will be
that the external historical actualization of the values will be particularly emphasized. Especially insofar as social principles are concerned, this result leads
to a strong conservatism. Since an intuitive, absolute element is inherent
in human knowledge, that which is externally perceived will be treated as
absolute by such a conceptual mode of comprehension. The transcendent

ethical reality will then be sealed off in a chunk of historical reality, as often
happened, for example, in the case of the principle of private property. If
new situations are judged on the basis of such principles, one will necessarily undershoot one's m.rk. This new situation will not be evaluated from
the . standpoint of transcendent values, but from the standpoint of norms
which too largely bear the stamp of the past. How often has it not happened that in regard to social matters urgent reforms have been delayed in
the name of, an immutable divine law?
Neither should we make too rational a distinction between the principles
on the one hand and their application to reality on the other, especially if
such a distinction then implies primarily a one-way direction from the principles to the applications. The relationship between the principle and a particular case should be understood as that of background and figure. Just as
the background appears behind the figure as present but also absent, so one
recognizes the principle behind the factual circumstances. On the other hand,
as the figure stands out against the background, so the factual circumstances
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appear meaningful only in the light of the principle. An enriching dynamic
relation must persist continuously between both.
If the natural law is grasped in a purely univocal concept, this will easily
lead to a minimizing of its values. The abstractive method seeks what is
uniformly common. The criterion is: what is not present in all subjects
should not be included in the description of their essence. In this way what
is valid for everyone at the level of a common denominator is taken as essential natural law. In the existentialist vision, however, the natural law grows
with the increase of the moral sense.
By continually visualizing the principles as ideal-values, one can avoid
also the rationalist pseudo-problem as to how one elementary principle can
come into conflict with another. The conceptual method has a divisive character and contrasts the various precepts of the natural law with one another
as distinctly separate entities which then must be brought into harmony.
In a conflicting situation it is supposed that one principle dispenses a person
from adherence to another. According to this approach, for instance, the
doctrine of private property is modified by the correction that numerous
social obligations are attached to private property. When, however, the concrete-intuitive experience also plays its role actively and participates in conceptualization, concept and experience converge, and a retroactive modification need not be made. The integration takes place from within. The distinct principles then represent the many-sided features of the one moral
ideal, which is ultimately expressed in the formulation - which is at once
conceptually meaningless, and hence intuitively in all respects meaningful -:
do what is right for the other person in this world for the sake of the Absolute Other One. When a principle is conceived as an ideal-value, all integrating tendencies towards the other ideal-norms automatically come to
the fore. It is precisely this integrating tendency towards identity with the
moral ideal, towards total union in love, which invests the norms with moral
values. Thus it is not necessary, for instance, that a possible theory of private
property based on the natural law be modified in retrospect by the principle
of social responsibility. The proprietary right in its ideal-value visualizes property against the background of human relations. The owner's subjective right
is then seen as an intersubjective one.

III. THE

NATURAL

LAW IN ITS SHIFTING HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS

THE vARious INTERPRETATIONS of the natural law are intimately bound up
with the various shades of meaning attached to the term "nature" during
different cultural periods. Nature is not an immutable and fixed entity. The
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concept of it undergoes changes which are contingent upon man's attitude
toward it. This evolving concept emerges in historical perspective. There
exists an interconnection between man and nature: nature is related to man,
and man is always related to nature. Nature and man constitute correlative
entities that are mutually explanatory. The different meanings of "nature"
result from the fact that man is called to cultivate nature. On the one hand,
man employs nature as an "object"; on the other, he realizes that he is immersed in nature and participates in it. The relationship between nature as
object and nature as origin is characterized by the dialectics of background
and figure. Nature as a horizon is not the external framework of nature as
an object, but causes nature as an object to come to the fore. Conversely,
only from the viewpoint of nature as an object does nature as a horizon
become clearly visible. Between these two mutually complementary polarities,
nature as origin and nature as object, the different interpretations of nature
oscillate. Man becomes aware of nature as origin to the extent that he succeeds in bringing nature as object to the front; yet this delimitation of nature as object always possesses only tentative validity, because it is achieved
within the horizon of nature as origin whose boundaries can never be completely objectified. The manifold interpretations of the concept of nature are
thus closely bound up with man's changing attitude with regard to nature.
In other words, the concept of nature varies with the history of culture.
The natural law, which considers nature as the origin and fountainhead
of ethical standards and legal norms, shows in its historical development
a constant shifting of perspective which is contingent upon man's changing
attitude toward nature as an object. In the following presentation of some of
these shifts in interpretation we should never lose sight of the unchanging
identity of natural law exactly insofar as it is the expression of the absolute
ethical ideal.
Nature in the primitive world-view possesses a more sacred and normative
character than in our cultural climate. Primitive man experiences nature
as an absolute, mysterious reality which eludes man's controlling power. Despite the differences in mentality existing among the primitives, a number of
general characteristics can be noted.
The primitive mentality is characterized by a nondiflerentiating experiencing of all aspects of life. The sacred and the profane, the personal and
the social, the inner and the exterior worlds are most intimately and indistinguishably blended. The primitive mind does not at all - or at most, very
vaguely - distinguish between the various categories of life such as space
and time, the part and the whole, objects and their properties. It is difficult
to imagine such a primitive world-view from the standpoint of modern
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man's world of sharply distinct categories. Nature, which to the technical
man has become an object that can be controlled and put to use, is to the
primitive man a mysterious sacred power. To him it is the Origin, Being,
and Becoming of everything, of himself as well as the universe. It reveals
itself in man and in the realities around him as a numinous force. The manyfaceted dependence on nature is experienced as a dependence on mysterious
divine powers. Even the soul which belongs to man appears as an inscrutable
divine force which dominates man. This all-embracing nature bears for the
primitive always an essentially sacred character. That is why every striking
aspect of nature is surrounded with a religious ritual. All the cosmic happenings, such as the lunar phases, the solstices, light and darkness, the succession of the seasons, are observed and celebrated. Also the human physiological functions, such as feeding, eating, sleeping, defecating, copulating,
constitute a participation in a sacred natural order. Nature virtually possesses
a supernatural quality; yet, the supernatural is still completely situated in
the world, the here and now, the diesseits. The primitive's religious approach is not as yet purely spiritual and supernatural, because nature is not
yet material and profane.
. In primitive mentality this mysterious nature from which everything takes
its being, is "prior" to man, but this "prior" does not mean a past time in
our sense of the word. It is a mythical time -to our conception an atemporal one - in which past, present, and future intermingle in undifferentiated fashion. Its "in illo ternpore" cannot be described in terms of our
time categories. Primitive man continually longs to participate in the constant rejuvenation of nature. The principal events of his life are therefore
encompassed by initiation rites. In these rites he dies in order to be born
anew, and in so doing he becomes one with nature.
The primitive's entire life is determined in religiously normative fashion
by this "supernatural" nature. The traditional customs and habits possess
a profoundly religious meaning and are accepted without question, so that
they need no rational proof. Since this nature embraces and guides everything, all of society is ruled by its "demonic" authority. In this primitive
acceptance of life, the natural, ethical, and religious dimensions constitute
one and the same reality.
Vestiges of such a mythical mentality can still be found in early.Greek
man. The Greek epic teaches us that the sacred and the profane spheres of
life were experienced in an undifferentiated way. However, the culture of
Hellas gradually outgrew the realm of myth and magic. The Greek thinkers
embarked upon explaining the universe rationally and they attempted to
penetrate into the natural order. These philosophers began to express their
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thoughts on the universe in logical instead of mythological terms. Through
this first attempt at objectivation man gradually began to place nature opposite to himself, and the religious aspect was pushed into the background.
This objectivation of nature also entailed an objectivation of man, who still
belonged to nature. More and more, nature came to be understood as a
reality that existed independently and in itself. Pre-Socratic philosophy
searched for the first principle that would encompass the many entities and
at the same time was their very origin and essence. Behind the multiplicity
of the phenomena the philosophers attempted to discover a unifying eternal
principle which they called nature. One thinker saw this eternal principle
as water, another as light, and again another as number.
Greek thought kept pace with the general progress of society. Because
man began to interfere more and more actively in the existing world order,
the traditional ethos began to lose its mythical character. When, through the
development of crafts the city-state came into being and the citizens started
making their own laws, a crisis occurred in the realm of the commonly
accepted certainties. The existing world-view lost its self-evident religious
character and became secularized: the new polis with its own government
and laws was felt to be a purely human concern. Moreover, the contact with
nations that held different views and customs caused a notion of relativeness to gain ever-wider acceptance. Typical of the changed outlook of this
period was the Sophists' distinction between laws that were valid physei, "by
nature," and laws that were valid nomooi, "by agreement." The age compelled man to begin contemplating the origin and the content of the norms
that were to sustain order among men and in society. The philosophers
searched for the eternal and immutable in the multiplicity of phenomena and
believed that the universe was governed by law and not by chance.
Man proved himself capable of gaining insight into the harmonious inner
order prevailing in nature and within himself. The ancient mythological
world-view was based on the capricious and arbitrary power of the gods,
which, in turn, reflected primitive man's defenseless and dependent position
in nature. Although this archaic "cosmology" was replaced by the concept
of a rational and beautifully ordered cosmos, nature itself remained of a
higher order. Life was based upon a nature that was no longer divine in
itself but was nevertheless visualized as a higher law of life. Through the
philosophies of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle the divine logos became more
and more a cosmic rationality and necessity which permeated nature as
well as human consciousness. Thus there arose in antiquity the doctrine of
the natural law as the expression of this rational cosmic order. The Greek
and subsequently the Roman world continued to express great diffidence
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and respect for this natural law as a norm for man's actions. According to
the Stoa, leading one's life in accordance with the laws of nature remained
an absolute ethical norm safeguarded from every human whim. In antiquity logos, cosmos, nature, and law were intimately bound up with one
another.
The medieval outlook bore great resemblance to the Greco-Roman worldview. Yet during this period man succeeded in putting himself at a certain
distance from nature by overcoming somewhat his dependence upon it. In
this way he was able to gain for himself a margin of freedom. But even at
this time man did not advance in his technical ability beyond the application
of those laws in which nature revealed itself. He was able to use only those
forces which were volunteered, so to speak, by nature. Some harnessing of
nature occurred, but its extent remained quite limited and insignificant. The
feudal relationships had naturally grown out of the ancient tribal associations,
and urban society was founded on a natural division of labor. Life took place
according to a familiar, stable pattern which was therefore looked upon
as natural.
Yet here too arose the need for renewed reflection on the norms of life
which man needed in order to control and keep pace with his increasing
involvement in the secular. Medieval philosophy fell back on Greek cosmic
philosophy and on the concept of the natural law inspired by it. At the same
time Christianity placed the task imposed on man in a more meaningful
light. Greek culture envisioned the human ideal too much in the perspective
of earthly existence; the religious aspect was still too closely identified with
the profane. It should be remembered that virtue in the stoic sense consisted
in the imitation and affirmation of the cosmic necessity and rationality to
which all things, including man, were subject. Belief in a personal, transcendent God, who freely created man and the world, increased the value
of both world and man. The. Christian religion attributed to man a unique
value, because he was called to serve God in a personal relationship. A supernatural dimension was bestowed upon human dignity. The universe, being
God's creation, was also designated as good; and to man was assigned the
task of bringing this goodness to completion. In this manner the world shared
in the Christian eschatology.5
During the Middle Ages the mythical attitude towards life was supplanted by a philosophical-contemplative world-view. The universe, again
understood in terms of a reality governed by immutable laws, was at the
same time envisioned by theocentric medieval thinkers as a static reflection
5.

Cf. A. VAN MELSEN. NATUURWETENSCHAP EN TECHNIEK 192-194 (1960).
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of the eternal divine order. It was conceived as a unified hierarchy within
the framework of which man and society were assigned a pre-established
position. Everything inside as well as outside man was traced back to a
given nature as an objective order of things. By means of logical reasoning man attempted to infer the immanent divine order. In contrast with
contemporary views, nature in this period was conceived of in a strongly
objectivist vein. This given nature was the revelation of being, the norm
of knowledge, and the code of conduct. In this world-view based on the
physical, the natural order was considered to be the prototype of all order.
Even God Himself, being the primordial cause of this order, was preferably
named the prime ruler, the unmoved mover and the eternal law. The revival of Roman law, through the efforts of jurists and theologians, particularly
brought out the dual nature of the medieval position. On the one hand,
linking up with the past, it attempted to create a suitable foundation for
the mythical-religious conception of life; on the other, it attempted to
take hold of the newly arisen situations in a normative way.6 The more conservative current of thought, based on Ulpian's formulation of the natural
law, sought to found life on an objectively given natural law which pertained
to all living beings in common, animals as well as human beings. The other
trend stemmed from human attempts to render nature subservient to man's
designs; it understood the natural law as a typically human order which
as such was known solely by man. Both views continued to recognize the
lex aeterna as the supreme normative principle and the archetype of all
natural law.
With the growth of the cities through the expansion of crafts and commerce, new social structures arose for which neither the criteria and guiding
principles of the family relationship nor the traditions of the feudal system
could provide the philosophical and spiritual foundation. There grew a
need for a legislating and organizing authority which was in a position to
impose norms upon the members of the community, although the law during this period was not yet a sovereign law imposed from above. The Middle
Ages were still engaged in solving the juridical problem from the vantage
point of an objectively given order. The mythical spirit developed into the
more rational, logical principle of the common weal. The common weal
gave suitable natural legitimation from the viewpoint of natural law to the
social relationships which had come into being through crafts and commerce. Legislative authority still concerned itself primarily
with the social
justification of situations which had naturally developed. The stress on tran6.
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quility of order as the highest social principle of natural law resulted from
the still predominantly static character of medieval society. The desire for
order did not go beyond sanctioning that which already contained an element of order. Law was more customary law than legislative law. It was
not so much oriented toward the unique intrinsic value of the person himself as towards the protection of socially acquired privileges. We can speak
of a corporative rather than of a personal law, since human interrelationships bore an intercorporative rather than an interpersonal character. One
still perceives below the surface even during this period the cosmic substructure of life. In the Middle Ages, man still felt himself bound by the immutable laws of the cosmos which in its harmonious order referred to God.
The Greek and medieval attitude towards life which derived its security
from a natural order embracing all men and all things was increasingly
shaken when in the modem era man made nature more and more subservient to himself. Through the natural sciences of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, logical, systematizing reason developed into calculating,
measuring reason. With Descartes, Copernicus, Pascal, and others, the concept of infinity invaded the closed sphere of human life. With the rise of
the natural sciences man's attitude towards nature assumed a dynamic,
creative character. From the feudal relationships arose, in the postmedieval
period, the national states which came to concern themselves more and
more with technical and economic problems. The idea of the welfare state
grew and with a greater centralization of government became necessary.
The medieval concept of organic unity, according to which the several
corporate units were interrelated "by nature," increasingly ceased to correspond to the developing situation. The corporative and feudal relationships
lost their strength. In the place of an organic concept of state and society
arose the idea of a rational order promoted by the central authority of the
state. The Greco-Roman and the medieval world tended to view man as
a nature among many natures, at one with the cosmos. Their emphasis was
on the universe as a totality of which man is a part. In modem times, man
emerged from the familiar cosmic shell and attempted to design his own
universe. He viewed himself in opposition to nature, which as an "object"
was capable of being manipulated at will. Undoubtedly man had always
looked upon nature as an object of exploration. But whereas formerly only
those aspects of nature were cultivated that invited use, man now abandoned
his passive attitude and dauntlessly attempted to appropriate to himself all
of nature as an object. This led, on the one hand, to a greater awakening
of the "self" and a confrontation with nature as a "non-self." On the other
hand, every further objectivation of nature came to signify also an objec-
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tivation of human nature itself within the scope of scientific investigation.
Because modem man became conscious of his own self by viewing himself and nature as opposites, the human image acquired a curious schizoid
character. On the one hand, in his natural strivings man felt himself to be
in harmony with nature and became himself the object of the sciences. This
tendency led to empiricism. On the other hand, in the capacity of an organizing, ordering being, he felt himself to be distinct from, and elevated above,
this reality which he could master. This view led to a greater emphasis on
human subjectivity. Since man's awakening took place as to nature and
not as to his fellow man, as is happening in our time, this "subjectivity"
was characterized by an individualistic rationalism. Already with Descartes
the schizoid image of man began to come into prominence, as in his philosophy spirit and matter were understood as two dualistically opposed realities.
The natural law concepts mirrored the changes described above. While
the Middle Ages had visualized the natural law as a reflection of the eternal
law, God as nature's lawgiver was now pushed into the background. As
man's abilities increased, the natural order increasingly lost its sacred character. To be sure, philosophers such as Hugo Grotius still recognized God as
the origin of the laws that governed the universe, but after the divine act
of creation the natural order was considered to lead an independent existence. Thus the natural law was reduced to a purely immanent order of the
universe, and hence was secularized. Whereas the Middle Ages recognized
a natural law which man could rationally derive from an objectively given
world-order, such realism and objectivism lost its appeal in the face of the
new conditions. The nominalism of the Middle Ages began to replace this
"realistic" natural law with the subjectivist principle of the human will which
in time adopted social expediency as its lodestar. This rationalistic principle
of volition was better suited to the changed circumstances that forced Western
man to build up the world according to his own image.
The medieval harmany of the spheres was upset, and the individual parts
gravitated towards their own sovereignty. Natural law nominalism led, therefore, to the exaggerated individualism of the citizen and to an absolute and
unlimited sovereignty of the state. There no longer existed a stable objective order which united both. The only way in which the two could be
balanced was by the principle of contract, and in time this principle was
degraded to a purely arbitrary and formalistic device.
The natural law theory of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was
characterized by the conflict between these two spheres. The growing national
states found their justification in Machiavelli's theory of Staatsraison as the
formulative principle of the power-state and in Bodin's theory of sovereignty
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which placed the authority of the state above the law. The new natural law
principles of government became more and more formal constructions and
increasingly lost their material content. They often served the purpose of
logical justification of the absolute power of the rulers whose tasks became
less static, less the administration of justice, and more legislative and dynamic.
Meanwhile natural law nominalism still attempted to safeguard the citizen's
inalienable liberties. This attempt evolved into a drawing of lines "against"
the state, as the idea of a harmonious given order between the spheres of
private law and public law steadily lost its value. This led to an individualistic
conception of natural law, as with Locke, Wolff, and others, in which there
7
was hardly room for genuine communal law.

The nominalist conceptions of natural law were developed in a rationalistic as well as in an empirical direction by philosophies in these centuries.
The flourishing natural sciences, based on the interplay between mathematical rationality and empirical observation, furthered the development in
both directions. In this manner, de Groot, Pufendorf, and Thomasius undertook to construct a system of eternal, immutable rules of natural law which
could be derived from the ultimate axioms of human nature by the mathematical deductive method. The empirical tendency was found in Loke,
Hume, and others. Yet both currents initially showed a good deal of similarity, especially in method. The more concrete rules in the detailed natural
law system of de Groot were not derived from human nature according to
the a priori method, but according to the empirical method, and hence a
posteriori. Conversely, Hobbes forced the empirically observed phenomena into a deductively derived system which he had constructed along geometric
lines.
Postmedieval empiricism and rationalism in the concepts of natural law
corresponded typically to man's dualistic attitude with respect to nature. Man
still experienced nature as a reality withdrawn from man's controlling power,
whose laws he could merely discover. But it was soon realized that a knowledge of these laws would enable man to start dominating nature. Through
these developments natural law in its secularized form began to flourish during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The writers of this time were
less mindful of God as lawgiver and author of the natural law; but they
continued to adhere to the conviction that an immutable order prevailed
in the universe. Still basing themselves on this latter notion, they thus attempted to invest the evolving social conditions with a stable foundation.
Man's technical ability was still in its infancy. With the progression of its
7. Cf. J. MEKKES,
139-575 (1940).
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development nature lost its normative character and became in the nineteenth century a matter of an empirically determined regularity.
When therefore the scientific development which had started in the sixthe law was
teenth century reached a flourishing stage in the nineteenth,
interpreted pretty well from the standpoint of man's control over the world.
Now that the one-sided mathematical apriorism of Descartes had been
adapted to experimental observation, the aprioristic systems of law lost
ground to the empirical modes of thought. Positivism began to prevail. One
only needs-to think o'the theories of law inspired by sociological, utilitarian,
and materialistic doctrines. Legal positivism reduced natural law to the level
of a logical, technical category which virtually could be associated with any
material content. The magical element which formerly had been frequently
attributed to the order of nature was now attributed to the scientific concept
of law, and this in turn led to the ideology of progress.
Although man himself now undertook to create order and to render the
world of nature more and more artificial, he still lived under the illusion
that there existed a permanent order which could be gradually and scientifically discovered and put to use. However, this order was no longer experienced as possessing a normative character, but as an empirically observable fact. These speculations began already to anticipate 'the later development of decreasingly viewing nature as a given reality which man was
expected to obey. Only in retrospect did philosophical thinkers discover the
transformations which already had been brought into practice in man's
technical actions. During the twentieth century, the realization was born
that man himself creates order by means of his technical power and that a
permanent order as an objectivistic independent world, a monde-en-soi, is
nonexistent. 8
Contemporary thought, becoming aware of the metalogical and metarational, takes a stand against the distorted rational and logical attitude of
the preceding centuries. The natural sciences particularly- emphasize this
change. Classical physics was founded on the idea that the laws of nature,
which man discovered, were objective realities. Contemporary physics
realizes that man is not an objective observer, but that he himself remains
present in the concepts whenever he approaches nature. The goal of the
natural sciences is no longer "nature in itself," but nature as approached by
man, in which approach the natural scientist himself also plays his part.
Even in the most exact science the word "nature" assumes a less objective and given character. Von Weizsicker writes: "Perhaps the most im8.
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portant intellectual contribution of contemporary physics is the discovery of
the necessity to consider the interrelation of matter and consciousness, of
object and subject, in a different light than it was conceived of in the philosophical tradition of the last century." 9 Bacon's idea that man must first
observe nature as a neutral onlooker in order to be able to subsequently
utilize it, is closely bound up with the concept of a given objectivistic independent world, a monde-en-soi, which is not tenable. Science is less the progression from one certainty to the next, as the reflection of an immutable
natural order, than the revealing of a reality in the construction of which
man has always played his part, a reality which recedes like a horizon with
every objectivation.
According to the rationalistic conception of the preceding centuries, scientific knowledge constitutes the thesis, and the as yet unknown factor X the
hypothesis. Strictly speaking, modem science now poses the thesis that reality
will always transcend human reason and that all scientific endeavor is merely
hypothetical, i.e., it bears a tentative character, and its results will have to be
continually altered. There is no given natural order existing from eternity,
whose laws science attempts to trace. Nature begins to assume the character
of an object to be employed in the service of man creating order. That which
is natural in the sense of the orderly now becomes that which is artificial.
Planning supplants the naturalistic principle of laissez faire. But with this
rising power grows a new impotence. Man becomes aware that he may fall
victim to the impersonal powers and organizations which he himself has
created. Powerlessness against the technical world has replaced powerlessness
against the world of nature. It is being more and more realized that the essentially human qualities cannot be made by man, but are received as a gift. The
ideologies which believed in an economic and technical order that creates
happiness have lost favor. The law of life does not lie in the power motif,
but in the surrender to and the respecting of the other person. The new security will be found in interhuman relationships which are not purely the
result of human achievement.
Against the background of these revolutionary changes in the technical,
natural world-view the shifts in emphasis regarding the natural law as a
normative criterion of human actions can now be understood. We are not
any longer primarily concerned with a natural order, but rather with a
personal one. The norms are not vested in the immutable laws of a worldorder seen through the eyes of physicists, but they are vested in the immutable
9. PHYSIK DER GEGENWART 11 (1953). See A. Kockelmans, Eenheid en Verscheidenheid
in de Wetenschap volgens het Standpunt der Phaenomenologie, 22 TXjDSCHRIPT VOOR
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value of the human person. This means a shift in ideas from a static morality
of duty to an ethics of the ideal. When the natural law was still the reflection
of a stable social pattern, the meaning of human life was, so to speak, made
objective and circumscribed in social morality and customs. Ethics then placed
a strong stress on man's dutiful and conforming adaptation to the given social
ethos. Personalist ethics today shows a greater awareness of the intrinsic value
of the person in the capacity of designer of his own life, and does not envision
natural law primarily as a series of set tasks, but as a charge and a calling.
Contemporary ethical consciousness appeals much more to the responsible selfcommitment of each human being. Self-development means first of all the
creative surrender of self to one's fellow men. The ethical 6lan is not directed
towards adaptation to a static natural community, but towards the dynamic
construction of the ideal personal community. The new task then is to make
my fellow man-and, by implication, myself-"be" in the fullest ideal capacity, within the framework of a supraindividual community of persons.
The world of technocracy is permeated with brotherhood and companionship. Man no longer encounters his fellow men indirectly in a commonly
owned and understood nature, but he virtually must rely on the other person
for the very development and cultivation of this world. One cannot deny
that the values of love, respect, admiration, and loyalty are acquiring a more
profound significance in our time. Whereas primitive men were captivated by
the spell of the unknown, mythical forces of nature, and man during the
rationalistic period manifested a magical admiration for a rational worldorder, it is now man's personal dignity which constitutes a new source of
ethical inspiration. 10
Love and respect for the irreplaceable and eternal values inherent in every
person invest contemporary natural law with a greater spiritual content.
Natural law is no longer one-sidedly understood as a given factual order, but
rather as a spiritual entity, which is not imposed from the outside as an
object, but which reveals itself in sincere intrapersonal contacts. In the
personalist conception this "supernatural" ethics of natural law is preferably
called the ethics of values. In this personalist ethics the biological and psychic
aspects of the person remain as a given natural aggregate which sets its own
normative standards. But this given aggregate is absorbed in the totality of
the person whose being is not a given entity, but rather a charge. It is
exactly each person's primary task to spiritualize these corporal aspects and
make them part of his personal, free existence. The personalist vision does
not see man's corporal nature in the first place in its character of object, but
10.
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rather as a concrete expression and actualization of an all-pervading love.
The traditional natural law theory was implicitly founded on the idea that
man lived in a world of immutable and supratemporal entities, from which
the ethical norms could supposedly be deduced. This undoubtedly fitted into
the cultural vision of those days, but this pattern of society has been outlived.
Within the framework of the contemporary cultural development, with its
acute awareness of man's involvement in history, such a concept of the natural
law makes a conservative and unrealistic impression. It formalizes the ethical
consciousness, particularly in its external phases, and applies the rules of the
natural law too much in terms of theoretical axioms. Every objectivation, including the objectivation of morality in the law, is abstract-universal. That is
why the ethical ideal, through a one-sided objectivating approach, easily fades
into a colorless uniformity of a minimized set of norms valid for the
average man. If concrete ethical living is too largely a practicing of a scientifically developed theory of the normal, then the sense of personal responsibility weakens and easily leads to an unauthentic performance
morality. Undoubtedly objectivation in terms of standards and norms remains
a valuable facet of ethical conduct, but this aspect must not be exaggerated.
Personalist morality speaks in terms of value rather than of natural law. It
emphasizes that the ethical reality must not be employed as an "object at
hand." We are concerned here with an existential reality. The ethical values
pertain to persons. Ultimately, moral truth is not an object, but a subject.
It is for this reason that sacred scripture states: "I am the Way, the Truth,
and the Life."
IV.

As

THE NATURAL LAW IN JuRrICAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE

IS THE CASE

with human life, the cultural pattern of a society constitutes

a totality of meaning in which the various aspects of life interpenetrate and
mutually influence one another. Contemporary personalist society manifests
the tendency towards an ever-richer differentiation of the different levels of
life within the framework of an ever-growing unity and integration. Thus, the
realms of law, ethics, and religion, for instance, in their increasing independence are actually growing more mutually dependent upon one another. Here
unity and distinction, integration and differentiation go hand in hand. Between
the various levels of life one cannot make univocal specific distinctions.
Jurisprudence is not something totally different from ethics. We are dealing
here with an analogous distinction within the unity of the structural totality.
Jurisprudence has its own sphere; but the more the legal order achieves its
own perfection, the more it transcends itself in pointing to the realm of ethics,
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without ever becoming ethics. The same situation prevails with respect to the
ethical dimension. To the extent that the ethical attitude asumes its own perfection, the more it transcends itself, without ever becoming religion. When
a certain phase becomes mature, it then truly is a "phase," i.e., it particularly
points to the next higher one.1 1
Two important conclusions result from this mysterious simultaneity of
unity and differentiation, insofar as the ethical and the legal dimensions are
concerned. If the legal sphere ignores its lan towards ethics, it cannot itself
flourish. Law then involuntarily draws ethics into its own sphere, with the
result that the legal order will be absolutized ethically. Conversely, if the
ethical order does not respect the inherent value of the sphere of law, this
will lead to a degeneration of ethics. Ethics then will in turn identify itself
easily with law, and the ethical consciousness will assume the appearance of
what is outwardly and socially proper and enforceable.
When during the preindustrial era man was still familiar with a stable
pattern of life, the legal and ethical dimensions were far less distinct. The
same categories of natural law and positive law were employed for both
aspects of life. This mutual identification was possible because the natural
law was understood as a totality of general normative rules, founded on a
traditionally given natural order. In this static society the norm was characterized by regularity, and what was regular assumed a normative character.
Thus the concepts of the natural law could be quite univocally understood
and applied in ethics as well as in law. In our dynamic society this traditional
pattern of existence has been outlived. In ethics as well as in law the natural
law must be interpreted less univocally and more analogously. This has not
always been done. The result for the realm of law was that an established
social situation frequently was considered as ethically absolute. Let us remember, for instance, how difficult it was to accept changing relations in
regard to ownership or questions of social security. Social progress was often
arrested in the name of the immutable natural law. Ethics, which in turn
incorporated a strong legal strain, came to be at the service of what was
socially proper, and ethical precepts were far too unauthentically lived.
In the present period of growth the natural law is distinguished analogously in the realms of ethics and law. In an ethic oriented towards the person
the natural law becomes a more existential reality, which can be expressed
only in ideal-concepts. It appeals to the authentic choice of man, who, from
his very being as a person, must fashion a concrete universal image of man,
more in the manner of a creator than of a conformist. It is precisely this spir11. Cf.
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itual, ideal nature that deepens the laws of physical nature, since it is man's
corporal nature which makes its demands exactly as an incarnate spiritual
reality. Natural law interpreted in terms of persons emphasizes more the
normative and less the ruling character of law. It poses the personalist ideal
as being normative, the ideal which man should fashion individually out of
his unique and, hence, concrete-universal, intrinsic personal value. It does
not take as its point of departure a set of fixed rules; that is to say, it does
not pose first and foremost a general and uniform image of man, although
this image has its place because of the quality of "species" which belongs
to man as an incarnate being.
The sphere of law, on the contrary, places greater emphasis upon the
uniformly fixed rules of the natural law and attempts to effect the personalist ideal in the world of space and time. Because of this element of
practical application, the natural law of this legal dimension possesses another,
although not totally different, color. The personalist strain of ethics renders
law itself more functional. Law's content of rules is seen not so much as
dependent on a natural static order but as possessing a dynamic, functional
character because of its active orientation towards the ideal personal community. Law, then, originates less from an observed natural regularity; it is
not so much customary law. On the contrary, it attempts to create regularity,
and through this becomes law-creating law. It is in this way that the basic
rights formulated constitutionally-being natural law in legal perspectiverender the personal values applicable in terms of generally valid rules. By
virtue of its essence this natural law requires elaboration in specialized legal
regulations in order to create for the moral ideal a frame of reference which
is at once as enlargeable and as ingeniously structured as possible.
However, in distinguishing betwen the natural law in terms of ethics and
law, the unity of human existence must be adhered to. One must continue
to visualize ethics and law as an inseparable dual unity.
This article has dealt with some shifts in emphasis and interpretation in
contemporary ethical thinking. Currents of modem philosophy have made
substantial contributions to ethics, whatever exaggerations they have entailed.
Those who are concerned about the present ethical climate should have
confidence in the natural law which they themselves want to defend. Did
not St. Thomas teach that the natural law is, first of all, the spontaneous
insight into good and evil, an insight naturally given to every man as a gift
of God? The natural law has been engraved in the heart of man - in his
heart and not in his scientific intellect.
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